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The Crime of Conspiracy Thrives in Decisions of
the United States Supreme Court*
PaulMarcus**
I.

INTRODUCTION

For most of the past century, the crime of conspiracy has generated a
good deal of controversy before the Supreme Court. Whether with issues
concerning broadening a hearsay exception based on a purported
conspiracy to conceal as part of an initial agreement' or with the limits of
proof as to individual membership in a conspiracy, 2 the Justices
consistently looked with care at the reach of the crime.

*C Paul Marcus, 2015. Portions of this paper were initially presented in a talk at the University of
Kansas in September, 2014.
**Haynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
1. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949), made the point clearly that such
government theories would be closely scrutinized:
Although the Government recognizes that the chief objective of the conspiracytransportation for prostitution purposes-had ended in success or failure before the
reported conversation took place, it nevertheless argues for admissibility of the hearsay
declaration at one in furtherance of a continuing subsidiary objective of the conspiracy.
Its argument runs this way. Conspirators about to commit crimes always expressly or
implicitly agree to collaborate with each other to conceal facts in order to prevent
detection, conviction and punishment. Thus the argument is that even after the central
criminal objectives of a conspiracy have succeeded or failed, an implicit subsidiary phase
of the conspiracy always survives, the phase which has concealment as its sole
objective....
We cannot accept the Government's contention. There [is a] . . . prerequisite to
admissibility, that hearsay statements by some conspirators to be admissible against
others must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy charged, [which] has been
scrupulously observed by federal courts. The Government now asks us to expand this
narrow exception to the hearsay rule and hold admissible a declaration, not made in
furtherance of the alleged criminal transportation conspiracy charged, but made in
furtherance of an alleged implied but uncharged conspiracy aimed at preventing detection
and punishment.... The rule contended for by the Government could have far-reaching
results. For under this rule plausible arguments could generally be made in conspiracy
cases that most out-of-court statements offered in evidence tended to shield coconspirators. We are not persuaded to adopt the Government's implicit conspiracy
theory which in all criminal conspiracy cases would create automatically a further breach
of the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
2. Contrast, for instance, the holdings in Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 714
(1943), and United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1940). The former allowed for
convictions without any direct evidence of conspiratorial involvement, while the latter did not.
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In recent years, however, that careful look has vanished as the Court
has time and again rendered decisions strongly in favor of government
conspiracy prosecutions using as a key basis the dangers to society of the
offense. With little review, one can see that this state of affairs was not
always so.
For many years, Justices of the United States Supreme Court
expressed serious reservations about the reach of the conspiracy charge
and the problems created at trial by the charge. Perhaps no member of
the Court more forcefully made this point than Justice Jackson in this oftquoted concurring opinion of more than one-half century ago:
There is, of course, strong temptation to relax rigid standards when
it seems the only way to sustain convictions of evildoers. But statutes
authorize prosecution for substantive crimes for most evildoing without
the dangers to the liberty of the individual and the integrity of the

judicial process that are inherent in conspiracy charges. We should

3.

Two of the more prominent illustrations are Grunewaldv. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 402

(1957) (application of the statute of limitations for "concealed" conspiracy actions), and Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978)
(restricting the use of the Smith Act, crime of sedition). In Grunewald, the Court wrote:
[A]llowing such a conspiracy to conceal to be inferred or implied from mere overt acts of
concealment would result in a great widening of the scope of conspiracy prosecutions,
since it would extend the life of a conspiracy indefinitely.

Acts of covering up, even

though done in the context of a mutually understood need for secrecy, cannot themselves
constitute proof that concealment of the crime after its commission was part of the initial
agreement among the conspirators. For every conspiracy is by its very nature secret; a

case can hardly be supposed where men concert together for crime and advertise their
purpose to the world. And again, every conspiracy will inevitably be followed by actions
taken to cover the conspirators' traces. Sanctioning the Government's theory would for
all practical purposes wipe out the statute of limitations in conspiracy cases, as well as

extend indefinitely the time within which hearsay declarations will bind co-conspirators.
Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402. The language in Yates was also quite cautious:
The Government contends that even if the trial court was mistaken in its construction
of the statute, the error was harmless because the conspiracy charged embraced both
'advocacy' of violent overthrow and 'organizing' the Communist Party, and the jury was
instructed that in order to convict it must find a conspiracy extending to both objectives.
Hence, the argument is, the jury must in any event be taken to have found petitioners

guilty of conspiring to advocate, and the convictions are supportable on that basis alone.
We cannot accept this proposition for a number of reasons. The portions of the trial
court's instructions relied on by the Government are not sufficiently clear or specific to
warrant our drawing the inference that the jury understood it must find an agreement
extending to both 'advocacy' and 'organizing' in order to convict. Further, in order to
convict, the jury was required, as the court charged, to find an overt act which was

'knowingly done in furtherance of an object or purpose of the conspiracy charged in the
indictment,' and we have no way of knowing whether the overt act found by the jury was
one which it believed to be in furtherance of the 'advocacy' rather than the 'organizing'
objective of the alleged conspiracy. The character of most of the overt acts alleged
associates them as readily with 'organizing' as with 'advocacy.'
Yates, 354 U.S. at 311.
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disapprove the doctrine of emplied [sic] or constructive crime in its
entirety and in every manifestation. And I think there should be no
straining to uphold any conspiracy conviction where prosecution for the
substantive offense is adequate and the purpose served by adding the
conspiracy charge seems chiefly to get procedural advantages to ease
the way to conviction.4
No less a judicial luminary than Learned Hand had similar thoughts
regarding the use of the conspiracy charge:
[S]o many prosecutors seek to sweep within the drag-net of conspiracy
all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the
main offenders. That there are opportunities of great oppression in
such a doctrine is very plain, and it is only by circumscribing the scope
5
of such all comprehensive indictments that they can be avoided.
As has been chronicled many times, the conspiracy charge subjects
offenders at trial to troubling procedural disadvantages, 6 the potential for
harsh sentences if convicted of conspiracy,' and liability for crimes
4. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 445 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson referred to the
cautionary report of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges written in 1925:
We note the prevalent use of conspiracy indictments for converting a joint
misdemeanor into a felony; and we express our conviction that both for this purpose and
for the purpose--or at least with the effect-of bringing in much improper evidence, the
conspiracy statute is being much abused.
'Although in a particular case there may be no preconcert of plan, excepting that
necessarily inherent in mere joint action, it is difficult to exclude that situation from the
established definitions of conspiracy; yet the theory which permits us to call the aborted
plan a greater offense than the completed crime supposes a serious and substantially
continued group scheme for cooperative law breaking. We observe so many conspiracy
prosecutions which do not have this substantial base that we fear the creation of a general

impression, very harmful to law enforcement, that this method of prosecution is used
arbitrarily and harshly. Further the rules of evidence in conspiracy cases make them most
difficult to try without prejudice to an innocent defendant.'
Id. at 446 n.2 (internal citation omitted).
5. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940).
6. This includes, among others, liberal venue principles, admissibility of declarations of coconspirators, and the joinder of both defendants and charges. I have discussed these problems on a
number of occasions. See Paul Marcus, Re-Evaluating Large Multiple-Defendant Criminal
Prosecutions, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 67, 74 (2002); Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law:
Time to Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever More TroublingArea, I WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1, 44-45 (1992); Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement, in Theory and in Practice,

65 GEO. L.J. 925, 965-66 (1977) [hereinafter The Criminal Agreement].
7. Most United States jurisdictions penalize the convicted conspirator severely. To be sure, in
a number of states, conspiracy carries a penalty that is the same as that for the most serious offense

to which the defendant conspired to commit. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 905 (2014); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-304 (2015). The Supreme Court of the United States has long allowed
consecutive sentences for the conspiracy crime and the substantive offense, which was the object of
the agreement. As stated in Callananv. United States:
The distinctiveness between a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit is a
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committed by co-conspirators even without the actual aid of all those
party to the pact.8 There has been an intense and ongoing debate by
scholars concerning the crime of conspiracy and whether the problems
with it outweigh its benefits. Some have argued that there is little need
for the crime. 9 Others have questioned the broad application of the crime
by the courts.' 0 Others have argued vigorously in support of the use of
criminal conspiracy law." That debate has not, however, resonated with
postulate of our law. "If [sic] has been long and consistently recognized by the Court that
the commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and
distinct offenses ....
This settled principle derives from the reason of things in dealing
with socially reprehensible conduct: collective criminal agreement-partnership in
crime-presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts.
364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
The defendants in most states can also receive consecutive sentences for convictions of both
conspiracy and substantive offenses committed in furtherance of the scheme. See, e.g., Bishop v.
State, 98 A.3d 317, 328 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014); State v. Holliday, 982 A.2d 268, 270 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2009); Byrom v. State, 978 So. 2d 689, 691 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Ybarra, 830
P.2d 522, 527 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992); State v. Ballard, 439 A.2d 1375, 1380, 1390 (R.I. 1982). The
Supreme Court in a case of broad significance held that defendants, in a single conspiracy, who were
convicted of violating two related-but distinct-drug conspiracy statutes could be sentenced
consecutively. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). This treatment in our
nation is in striking contrast to that seen in other common law nations where conspiracy is not seen
as especially important in criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., BRITISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON
CONSPIRACY AND CRIMINAL LAW REFORM, No. 76, 2-3 (HMSO, London, 1976); PETER GILLIES,
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, 256 (2d ed. 1990) ("obviously wrong [in Australia] to
sentence [defendant] twice over for a conspiracy and for a substantive offence or offences committed
pursuant to it").
8. Under the Pinkerton doctrine (accepted by most states and in the federal system), a
defendant can be held responsible as a principal for all crimes committed by co-conspirators so long
as "the substantive offense [is] committed by one of the conspirators ... in furtherance of the
conspiracy [unless those substantive offenses do] not fall within the scope of the unlawful project, or
[were] merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be reasonably foreseen as a
necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement." Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640, 647-48 (1946). The range of this principle has been applied in breathtaking fashion in both the
state and federal courts. It has allowed convictions for crimes such as armed robbery, United States
v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007); manslaughter, State v. Coward, 972 A.2d 691, 702-03
(Conn. 2009); and murder, People v. Zielesch, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
9. Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1139-40
(1973) (positing that little would be lost for the government if the crime were to be wholly
eliminated). In an earlier piece, I agreed with Professor Johnson's basic notion, but I contended that
he went too far in calling for its elimination. See Marcus, The Criminal Agreement, supra note 6, at

966.
10.

Steven R. Morrison, Requiring Proof of ConspiratorialDangerousness, 88 TUL. L. REV.

483, 513 (2014) (asserting that evidence is sparse as to whether agreements to commit crimes
actually do create greater dangers justifying the crime of conspiracy).
11. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1309-10 (2003) (making the
case for the necessity of using the charge broadly). The court in United States v. Hassan gave a

spirited defense of the conspiracy offense, there in a terrorist prosecution:
Absent the long reach of the federal conspiracy statutes, the government would have
been forced to pursue the appellants with one hand tied behind its back. No such
constraint served to hinder the investigation and prosecution of the appellants, however,
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the Supreme Court for many years, and, in this Article, I do not intend to
focus further on it.
For several decades now, one would be hard pressed to find any
serious concerns expressed by justices as to the crime or the way in
which conspiracy is prosecuted. To be sure, in virtually every major
conspiracy case to come before the Court since 1987, the government has
won convincingly--often times with nary a dissent.1 2 My own view is
that the Supreme Court has unwisely embraced so enthusiastically both
the conspiracy doctrine and the manner in which it is prosecuted. In the
major conspiracy cases I discuss below,1 3 I contend that the prudent
course here was not to do what the justices did: strongly support, in
almost every instance, the government position and ignore the reach of
and we are reminded once more that the charge of conspiring to commit a federal crime
has yet to relinquish its well-earned reputation as-in the words of Learned Hand-the
"darling of the modem prosecutor's nursery." Judge Hand's profound observation is as

true now as it was nearly ninety years ago.
Over the course of the modem legal era, the pursuit of federal conspiracy convictions

has doubtlessly been a boon to United States Attorneys.

And it is eminently fair and

reasonable to say that the implementing statutes-particularly those that dispense with
the commission of an overt act as an element of the crime-sometimes paint with a broad
brush. But our system of government and law reposes great and solemn trust in federal
prosecutors to exercise their discretion as instruments of right and justice, and it is
therefore "for prosecutors rather than courts to determine when to use a scatter gun to
bring down the defendant."
Indeed, the societal utility of conspiracy prosecutions as a weapon against evildoers is

manifest not merely in the substantive elements of the offense, but also in the procedural
mechanisms enabling its ready proof, even against those only marginally involved.

A

person intending to only be "in for a penny," with the slightest connection to an
established conspiracy, actually risks being "in for a pound.". .. Put succinctly, the
specter of federal criminal liability cannot help but serve as an intense deterrent to those
who otherwise would be bent on violence.

742 F.3d 104, 146 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
12. 1 use 1987, just under thirty years ago, as the cut-off year for several reasons. That was the
year William Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice. In the period since 1987, eighteen Justices
served (or continue to serve) on the Court: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and

Kagan, along with Rehnquist. The Justices came with diverse professional backgrounds including
private practice, public practice, judging, and law teaching.

This group was appointed by ten

Presidents (Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton, G.W.
Bush, and Obama). This thirty-year period has seen remarkable growth in federal criminal
jurisdiction, accompanied by equally remarkable shrinkage in the Supreme Court's docket. In 1987

the Court issued 187 substantive decisions.
Opinions from 1987, JUSTIA.COM,
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/year/1987.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). In the
2014-15 term the number declined to 66 decisions.
Opinions from 2014, JUSTIA.COM,
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/year/2014.html

(last visited Sept. 24, 2015); Opinions

from 2015, JUSTIA.COM, https://supremejustia.com/cases/federaVus/year/2015.html
(last visited
Sept. 24, 2015).
13. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 1 note in Subsection II.e that Bourjaily is
not truly a conspiracy ruling, even though the defendant was convicted on a conspiracy count. It is
more properly seen as an evidence decision.
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the conspiracy offense, a reach which continues to expand. Moreover, it
was not at all clear in these cases that an even-handed approach would
have necessarily led to the broad reaffirmation of conspiracy doctrine
and rules of practice. Still, in reading these cases, one is struck by just
how strongly the Justices have spoken in supporting such prosecutions.
It is to those cases, and the rationale for them, to which I will soon turn
in this Article.
Before doing so, however, it should be noted that the selected cases
for discussion are not the only conspiracy decisions of importance
decided by the Supreme Court in this time period. I chose these five
because of their impact on criminal conspiracy prosecutions nationwide.
Other conspiracy rulings from the Court are not found here because:
* They are of somewhat more limited significance. Cases
such as Rutledge v. UnitedStates14 fall into this grouping.
* They confused the law, offering little guidance to lawyers
and judges. Certainly the two decisions applying the Bruton
rule qualify. 5

14. 517 U.S. 292 (1996). The question in Rutledge was whether it was improper to sentence
the defendant to concurrent sentences for violations of a drug conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012)) as
well as for conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (21 U.S.C. § 848 (2012)). Id. at 292. The
Court held that it was, as "[a] guilty verdict on an § 848 charge necessarily includes a finding that
the defendant also participated in a conspiracy violative of § 846." Id. at 307. United States v.
Jimenez Recio is also not of great practical significance. 537 U.S. 270 (2003). There the Justices
struck down a lower court rule "that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the
conspiracy becomes impossible to achieve . . . ." Id. at 272. This rule, the Court found, is
inconsistent with the rationale for the conspiracy offense.
The Court has repeatedly said that the essence of a conspiracy is "an agreement to
commit an unlawful act." That agreement is "a distinct evil," which "may exist and be
punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues." The conspiracy poses a "threat to
the public" over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant substantive
crime-both because the "[c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of
[other] crimes" and because it "decreases the probability that the individuals involved
will depart from their path of criminality." Where police have frustrated a conspiracy's
specific objective but conspirators (unaware of that fact) have neither abandoned the
conspiracy nor withdrawn, these special conspiracy-related dangers remain. So too
remains the essence of the conspiracy-the agreement to commit the crime. That being
so, the Government's defeat of the conspiracy's objective will not necessarily and
automatically terminate the conspiracy.
Id. at 274-75 (citations omitted).
15. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 (1968), a co-defendant's confession
incriminated the appellant. The trial judge gave the jury a limiting instruction, saying that it should
use the confession as evidence only against the declarant and not against the appellant, even though
the appellant was named in the confession. Id. The Court held that the limiting instruction was
insufficient to protect the appellant's confrontation right:
Here the introduction of Evans' confession posed a substantial threat to petitioner's right
to confront the witnesses against him, and this is a hazard we cannot ignore. Despite the
concededly clear instructions to the jury to disregard Evans' inadmissible hearsay
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While conspiracy prosecutions, the ultimate decisions are
more concerned with other bodies of law. Boyle v. United
States1 6 is just such a case.

II. THE DECISIONS

A. Burden ofProofon Withdrawal; It Seems So Simple
In its most recent substantive conspiracy decision, the Court in Smith
v. United Statesl7 had a seemingly simple task. All it had to do was
restate the standard rule that withdrawal in a conspiracy case is an
affirmative defense and find yet again that the burden of proof as to
defenses is on the defendant unless otherwise legislatively determined.
In a short, unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, that is precisely
what the Court did. I believe, however, that the task was not so simple,
and the hombook law here is not so well-established as the opinion
indicates.
evidence inculpating petitioner, in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting
instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional right of crossexamination.
Id. at 137. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1998), and the earlier Richardson v. Marsh,
481 U.S. 200, 201-03 (1987), each applied Bruton to the situation in which the trial judge, in a joint
trial, allowed the confession of one defendant, but then eliminated (redacted) the confession's
reference to the non-declarant. To write that the two decisions are not exactly consistent, and offer
little guidance, is to seriously understate the matter. In Gray the Court held that "a redaction that
replaces a name with an obvious blank space or symbol or word such as 'deleted"' violates Bruton.
Gray, 523 U.S. at 189. In Richardson, the ruling was different; there a redaction was allowed which
"eliminate[d] not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence." Richardson,
481 U.S., at 211. Consistent and clear? Hardly. As one thoughtful commentator (a former student
of this writer) wrote:
Jurors are human beings, and it is sometimes impossible for them to suppress their
natural inclination to try to discover the identity of the redaction in a defendant's
confession and to not use the confession as evidence against his codefendant. In
attempting to protect the rights of defendants to cross-examine the witnesses against
them, however, the Supreme Court has only muddied the waters as to how a confession
of a codefendant may be introduced into evidence consistent with that right. It is of no
comfort to say that simply severing the trials or refusing to use the confession is the
solution to this problem, as these options may not be practical or may be overly
burdensome to prosecutors or defendants in some circumstances. It is necessary,
therefore, for the Court to finally and authoritatively settle the remaining issues that arise
when the confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced into evidence in a joint
trial.
Bryan M. Shay, "So I Says to 'The Guy,' I Says...": The Constitutionalityof Neutral Pronoun
Redaction in Multidefendant Criminal Trials, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 395 (2006).
16. 556 U.S. 938, 940-41 (2009). The decision focused principally on defining a key element
of the RICO statute (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
(2012)), the definition of an association-in-fact "enterprise."
17. 133S.Ct.714(2013).
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To understand this contrary view, one must look first to a few of the
basics regarding the crime of conspiracy. As Smith quite properly noted,
the essence of the crime is the agreement, "the combination of minds in
an unlawful purpose." 8 Moreover, as the opinion indicated, withdrawal
traditionally has been seen as an affirmative defense, something that
"does not negate an element of the conspiracy crimes charged."l 9
Finally, the courts have always determined that "[s]ince conspiracy is a
continuing offense, a defendant who has joined a conspiracy continues to
violate the law 'through every moment of [the conspiracy's]
existence ....
It certainly seems routine enough to then conclude, as all nine
Justices did, that withdrawal, like most defenses, requires the defendant
to shoulder the burden of persuasion. I suggest, however, that this
conclusion is neither certain nor routine because of the special role of
withdrawal with the crime of conspiracy.
As with other inchoate offenses, typically-in many U.S.
jurisdictions 2 1 -once the elements of the crime have been achieved, there
is no abandoning liability for that crime.22 Even in such a situation,
however, withdrawal can be important for other reasons. If acts, crimes,
18.
19.

Id. at 719.
Id.

20. Id. (citations omitted). And, of course, the conspirator "becomes responsible for the acts of
his co-conspirators in pursuit of their common plot" id, under the rule established in Pinkerton v.

UnitedStates, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). See discussion in supra note 8.
21. The Model Penal Code (MPC) would allow withdrawal for all three inchoate offenses.
With attempt, § 5.01(4) of the MPC allows for what the drafters referred to as Renunciation of
CriminalPurpose:
When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under Subsection (1)(b)
or (1)(c) of this section, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to
commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances
manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. The

establishment of such defense does not, however, affect the liability of an accomplice
who did not join in such abandonment or prevention.

The language is similar with the crimes of solicitation, MPC § 5.02(3), and conspiracy. MPC §
5.03(6) (1985). Many states have adopted some, or all, of these provisions. One commentator
recently noted that with the crime of attempt, slightly more than half the "jurisdictions in the United

States follow the Model Penal Code approach in allowing an affirmative defense of abandonment."
Gideon Yaffe, Criminal Attempts, 124 YALE L.J. 92, 142 (2014). A few examples of the MPC
approach are Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.020 (West 2015), OR. REV. STAT. § 161.430 (2015), and
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901(c) (1973).
22. Many jurisdictions hold that one cannot abandon an attempt once the action (substantial
step, action in close proximity to the completed crime, etc.) has been taken. See, e.g., State v.

Robins, 646 N.W.2d 287, 295 (Wis. 2002); People v. Herman, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 199, 215 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002). That would also be true of solicitation, once the act of encouragement or aid has been

taken. See e.g., State v. Lynch, 125 P.3d 1148, 1150 (Mont. 2005); People v. Manetas, No. 198568,
1998 Mich. App. LEXIS 1845, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. July 7, 1998); Moran v. Schwarz, 826 P.2d
952, 954 (Nev. 1992).
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or declarations of co-conspirators occur after withdrawal, they will not
be admissible against the defendant who is no longer part of the pact.
And, as in Smith, withdrawal can be of crucial significance with a statute
of limitations claim. 23 With such a claim, the defendant is asserting that
he cannot be found guilty of the crime of conspiracy, for the government
did not move against her during the statutory period. The Justices saw
that as a classic affirmative defense, so that the burden of proving
withdrawal may quite properly be placed on the defendant. 2 4 "Thus,
although union of withdrawal with a statute-of-limitations defense can
free the defendant of criminal liability, it does not place upon the
prosecution a constitutional responsibility to prove that he did not
withdraw. As with other affirmative defenses, the burden is on him."2 5
Others, however, took a quite different view of the role being played
with withdrawal and the statutory period. Probably the strongest judicial
statement of this position26 was made by the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Read.27 The court there focused its attention on two related, but
23.

The oddity in Smith is that the defendant did not ask for a jury instruction on point. Rather,

"[a]fter it began deliberations, the jury asked the court what to do in the event that a defendant
withdrew from the conspiracies outside the relevant limitations period." Smith v. United States, 133

S. Ct. 714, 718 (2013).
24. As opposed to claims that relate to elements of the crime, though they may seemingly
appear not to. The most prominent illustration is Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1975)
where the instruction in a murder case was found to violate due process because it placed onto the
defendant the burden to prove that he acted in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation thus
bringing the crime down to voluntary manslaughter. This was so because heat of passion was
actually an element of the manslaughter crime; a negative element, but an element nevertheless. Id.

at 703. But see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 228-30 (1977) (limiting the holding in
Mullaney to the second degree murder/voluntary manslaughter situation).

25.

Smith, 133 S. Ct. at 720. The Court explained further:

Allocating to a defendant the burden of proving withdrawal does not violate the Due
Process Clause. While the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged," "[p]roof of
the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required."

The State is foreclosed from shifting the burden of proof to the defendant only "when an
affirmative defense does negate an element of the crime." Where instead it "excuse[s]
conduct that would otherwise be punishable," but "does not controvert any of the
elements of the offense itself," the Government has no constitutional duty to overcome

the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 719 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Of course, all this makes sense if conspiracy is
thought of necessarily as a continuing offense. In such a situation, "[w]ithdrawal does not negate an
element of the conspiracy crimes charged here." Id As the court in Read pointed out, infra, another
view of the matter is to see that the government has the burden of showing defendant's membership

in the conspiracy at the time of the charge. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir.
1981).
26. For strong commentary in support of this position, see Linda Cantoni, Note, Withdrawal
from Conspiracy: A ConstitutionalAllocation of Evidentiary Burdens, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 438,

439-40 (1982).
27. 658 F. 2d at 1233.
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distinct, points.28 The first was the history of withdrawal and the notion
that the defendant has always had to prove her voluntary, timely, and
legally adequate abandonment of the endeavor. 2 9 This notion is cited
repeatedly by both state and federal courts, 30 relying almost entirely on
an early Supreme Court decision dealing principally with venue in
conspiracy cases, Hyde v. United States. 3 1 As Judge Bauer, for the Read
panel, showed rather persuasively, however, Hyde does not stand for that
proposition:
The government, however, insists that Hyde v. United States, a
long-established Supreme Court case, placed the burden of proving
withdrawal on the defendant. Indeed, Hyde has often been cited for
that proposition in the courts of appeals. Almost every case we
researched holds that the burden is on the defendant to "prove" or
"establish" withdrawal. Within this Circuit, we recently held that it "is
well-settled (that) this burden of establishing withdrawal lies on the
defendant."
We have, however, reexamined Hyde. Our research convinces us
that the cases, including our own, have misinterpreted Hyde.
According to our interpretation, Hyde placed only the burden of going
forward on the defendant . . .Hyde said nothing explicit about the
amount of evidence the defendant must offer to show "some act to
disavow or defeat the purpose" of the conspiracy. As one commentator
noted, the Hyde language "might have been interpreted as merely
shifting the production burden on the issue of withdrawal to the
defendant, and leaving the persuasion burden with the state." 32
The Supreme Court in Smith ignored this argument entirely.
The second point from Read is that under classic rules of substantive
criminal law, the burden of persuasion (as opposed to the burden of
production-coming forth with some credible evidence) regarding
elements of a crime cannot be on the defendant, as a matter of
constitutional law and policy. 33 As to elements of a charged crime, the
requirement is that the government show that during the appropriate time
28. Id at 1232-33, 1236.
29. Id. at 1232-36.
30. Including in the Smith opinion: "Petitioner's claim that assertion of a statute-of-limitations
defense shifts that burden is incompatible with the established proposition that a defendant's
membership in the conspiracy, and his responsibility for its acts, endures even if he is entirely
inactive after joining it." Read, 133 S. Ct. at 721. See also Hyde v. United States, stating "[a]s he
has started evil forces, he must withdraw his support from them or incur the guilt of their
continuance." 225 U.S. 347, 369-70 (1912).
31. 225 U.S. at 369.
32. Read, 658 F.2d at 1233-34 (citations omitted).
33. Id at 1232.
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(under the statute of limitations) the defendant charged with conspiracy
actually was a member of that conspiracy, as the Read court explained:
A subtle, but important, change was occurring. Within decades, the
Hyde rule that a defendant show some "affirmative action" to trigger
the withdrawal defense was transformed into a rule that the defendant
must meet "rigorous requirements" to show his withdrawal [the Read
court here noted that earlier cases to the contrary were ignored or
Present law now states the burden of establishing
distinguished].
withdrawal lies on the defendant.
The withdrawal rule is based on a misinterpretation of Hyde's
requirement that the defendant do "some act to disavow or defeat the
purpose" of the conspiracy to withdraw. We have traced back the
citation of authority in our own cases; they lead back to only the same
language in Hyde.
As withdrawal negates the essential element of membership, it must
be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt by the government. We
therefore overrule those cases imposing the burden of proving
withdrawal on the defendant. We hold today that the burden of going
forward with evidence of withdrawal and with evidence that he
withdrew prior to the statute of limitations remains on the defendant.
However, once he advances sufficient evidence, the burden of
persuasion is on the prosecution to disprove the defense of withdrawal
beyond a reasonable doubt. 3

This is a strong argument on the misreading of earlier precedent and
the due process requirement. The Supreme Court once again ignored the
assertion entirely.
Having noted concern with the Court's handling of the arguments in
Smith, let me hasten to note that it is not clear to me that the defendant's
position is necessarily the correct one, as withdrawal in some respects
does look like a classic affirmative defense.
Still, to see this short,
arguments is troubling
serious
some
ignoring
wholly
ruling
unanimous
6
indeed. The decision is dismissive of serious assertions, looking to the
danger posed by the conspiracy:
Having joined forces to achieve collectively more evil than he could
accomplish alone, Smith tied his fate to that of the group. His
individual change of heart (assuming it occurred) could not put the
34.
35.

Id. at 1235-36 (citations omitted).
As the Smith Court wrote. 133 S. Ct. at 720.

36.

Particularly in a case in which the defendant had spent the last six years of the charged

conspiracies in prison for a felony conviction. Id. at 718. The applicable statute of limitations, 18
U.S.C. § 3282 (2012), is five years.
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conspiracy genie back in the bottle. We punish him for the havoc
wreaked by the unlawful scheme, whether or not he remained actively
involved. It is his withdrawal that must be active, and it was his burden
to show that.37
B. Burdens of the Conspiracy, But Not the Benefits
Let us consider two conspirators driving in a car and transporting
illegal guns. Our conspirator is in the vehicle of her co-conspirator.
They are acting in furtherance of the pact, are transporting incriminating
evidence, and they are stopped by the police. The stop is in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. The co-conspirator/owner and driver of the car
moves to suppress the evidence, and his motion is granted.
The
conspirator/passenger also moves to suppress; her motion is denied.
As has been stated repeatedly over decades, "[a] conspiracy is a kind
of criminal partnership." 38 As such, this grouping together subjects
conspirators to broad and early liability as to crimes, acts and statements
of other conspirators, as noted above. Just as clear is the notion of
standing under the Fourth Amendment. 39 The defendant in making a
challenge to a search or seizure must demonstrate some individual
interest: "a violation occurs when government officers violate a person's

37.

Smith, 133 S. Ct. at 721.

&

38. Sixth Circuit Committee on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Pattern Criminal Jury
Instructions,
§
3.01 A(2),
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/intemet/crimjuryinsts/pdf/crmpattjur full.pdf.
For a detailed
discussion of the agreement requirement and the manner of proof, see PAUL MARCUS, THE
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES §§ 2.01-10 (Matthew Bender

Co., Inc.) (2015).
39. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist railed against the use of the term, preferring instead to
focus on concepts of individual privacy. In Rakas v. Illinois, he wrote: "[W]e are not at all sure that

the determination of a motion to suppress is materially aided by labeling the inquiry . .. as one of
standing, rather than simply recognizing it as one involving the substantive question of whether or
not the proponent of the motion to suppress has had his own Fourth Amendment rights infringed by

the search and seizure which he seeks to challenge." 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978).

In spite of the

critique, standing remains the key term in use. One commentator explained:
Over the last forty years, the Supreme Court has worked out a series of principles for
when a defendant has standing to object to the Fourth Amendment search of someone

else's property.

According to the those [sic] cases, the key issue is whether the

government violated the defendant's own reasonable expectation of privacy . . . , The
owner, legitimate renter, or legitimate repeated borrower of a car generally has standing

to object to a search of it. A person who steals a car or drives it in violation of a rental
contract does not.
Orin Kerr, Does Fourth Amendment Standing Work Differently for Jones Trespass Searches,
Traditional Katz Searches, and Long-term Katz Searches?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 14,

2012, 10:30 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/02/14/does-fourth-amendment-standing-work-differentlyfor-jones-trespass-searches-traditional-katz-searches-and-katz-long-term-expectation-of-privacysearches/.
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'reasonable expectation of privacy."'40
In United States v. Padilla,4 the government prosecutor sought to
prove the conspiracy case against one conspirator based on the allegedly
unlawful search of the car driven by another conspirator and owned by
still another conspirator.4 2 Padilla argued that because he was in the
conspiracy with the others, the car contained items intended to further the
conspiracy, and he was being charged in a conspiracy with those other
individuals, he ought to be able to challenge the search (and resulting
evidence) by the officer.43 The Ninth Circuit viewed the conspiracy
theory as trumping the standing rule and allowed the challenge. The
judges there made the point that "a coconspirator's participation in an
operation or arrangement that indicates joint control and supervision of
44
the place searched establishes standing."
In another short per curiam opinion, a unanimous Supreme Court
rejected the "conspiracy equals standing" view of the court of appeals.4 5
The opinion dealt firmly with the matter:
The "coconspirator exception" developed by the Ninth Circuit is,
therefore, not only contrary to [an earlier holding], but at odds with the
principle discussed above. Expectations of privacy and property
interests govern the analysis of Fourth Amendment search and seizure
Participants in a criminal conspiracy may have such
claims.
expectations or interests, but the conspiracy itself neither adds to nor
detracts from them. Neither the fact, for example, that Maria Simpson
was the "communication link" between her husband and the others, nor
the fact that Donald Simpson and Xavier Padilla were in charge of
transportation for the conspirators, has any bearing on their respective
Fourth Amendment rights.
For the Justices, the concept of agreement and joint liability was
simply irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment questions: did the petitioner
have "[an] ownership interest in the [property seized] [or a] legitimate

40. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967)).
41. 508 U.S. 77 (1993).
42. Id. at 78-80.
43. Id. at 79-81.
44. United States v. Padilla, 960 F.2d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 77 (1993)
(citation omitted). The principle could have been stated even more broadly, finding standing
anytime evidence was offered against any conspirator based on an allegedly unconstitutional search
or seizure of property of another conspirator, which contained items intended to further the
conspiracy.
45. Padilla,508 U.S. at 82.
46. Id.
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expectation of privacy in the area searched ... .4 Irrelevant? I am not
so sure. After all, the concept of agreement can tremendously affect
sentences, location of prosecutions, size of trials, and evidence being
offered. If used there, why not have at least a serious discussion of why
the fact of agreement does not also impact on the nature of the
government investigation resulting in highly prejudicial evidence?
Calling for symmetry between the burdens of conspiracy law and this
one benefit might well be viewed as appropriate and in keeping with an
even handed set of prosecution principles. The unanimous Supreme
Court was not persuaded.
C. Overt Act Not Required
The general U.S. conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, expressly
requires an overt act requirement ("If two or more persons conspire . .
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy"). 48 Some other federal conspiracy statutes do not have
explicit overt act requirements. At issue in United States v. Shabani was
one such law, involving a conspiracy to distribute cocaine.49 Section 846
of Title 21 of the United States Code states that it is a crime if "[a]ny
person ... conspires.,, 50 There is no mention of any sort of needed act in
furtherance of that pact." The question before the Court was whether the
silence of Congress in § 846 was purposeful so that the essential-indeed
the only necessary-element of proof was an agreement. Or, did silence
show that Congress had not considered the matter so that a reasonable
construction of § 846 would be to make it consistent with § 371,
mandating such an act?5 2
47. Id.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
49. 513 U.S. 10 (1994).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012).
51. See id
52. A follow-up case, Whitfield v. United States, raised the same question, though dealing with
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), conspiracy to commit money laundering. 543 U.S. 209 (2005). The answer of
the Court was the same-no overt act requirement:

Shabani distilled the governing rule for conspiracy statutes as follows: "'Nash and
Singer give Congress a formulary: by choosing a text modeled on § 371, it gets an overtact requirement; by choosing a text modeled on the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I [which,
like 21 U.S.C. § 846, omits any express overt-act requirement], it dispenses with such a
requirement."' This rule dictates the outcome in the instant cases as well: Because the
text of § 1956(h) does not expressly make the commission of an overt act an element of
the conspiracy offense, the Govemment need not prove an overt act to obtain a
conviction.
Id. at 214 (citations omitted). Lower courts have followed with other federal conspiracy statutes.
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Once again, a unanimous Court found for the government. Indeed,
the Justices had little difficulty in finding that the government would not
need to prove an overt act in order to have a conspiracy conviction, under
§ 846. Justice O'Connor gave several reasons for this conclusion. First,
she dealt with the intent of Congress:
Congress appears to have made the choice [to omit an overt act
requirement] quite deliberately with respect to § 846; the same
Congress that passed this provision also enacted the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 of which contains an explicit requirement that
"one or more of the [conspirators] does any act to affect the object of
such a conspiracy." 53
That Congress did in fact distinguish between the two conspiracy
That members of Congress actually
statutes is beyond debate.
considered this distinction and knowingly chose to treat § 846 differently
is another matter. A careful review of the legislative history for both
statutes finds no mention of an overt act requirement either in committee
reports or in statements on the floor of Congress. Congress truly was
silent on this point.
Second, the Justices looked to their long-standing tradition of
statutory construction whereby, "absent contrary indications, Congress
intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms."54 One
could not argue with this well-established convention that has been
55
applied quite a number of times.

On its face, the decision reached here is neither a surprise nor a
mystery. The opinion is short, it cites well-regarded precedent, and it
sticks closely to the careful reading of legislative language. It is,
nevertheless, troublesome for a few reasons. Let me hasten to point out
that it is not difficult because of the practical impact of the
determination. No, whether a conspiracy statute has an overt act element
or not will hardly matter in many cases. I explored the reason for this
The most recent case is United States v. Roy, 783 F.3d 418, 420 (2d Cir. 2015) (conspiracy to
commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006)).
53. Shabani, 513 U.S. at 14 (first alteration added) (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 13.
55. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1992) (Federal Tort Claims Act);
Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 339-40 (1945) (Selective Service Act); Nash v. United States,
229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913) (Sherman Antitrust Act). This rule has been followed in recent times as
well in cases such as: United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409-10 (2014) (possession of
firearms by one convicted of "a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"); Sekhar v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724 (2013) (violation of the Hobbs Act); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs.,
P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444-45 (2003) (coverage under Americans with Disabilities Act). All
cases in this footnote were cited in the opinion.
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long ago in an empirical study funded by the National Science
Foundation. There I looked to this question, among others: what is the
impact of an overt act requirement? Repeatedly then-and since-the
consistent response was that it basically had no impact at all.
Conversations with prosecutors confirmed this:
One stated that, "[n]o one will prosecute a case without an overt act;
generally there is at least an attempt unless you have an informant
which is the rare situation, for you find out about the conspiratorial
relationship from the overt act."
Another said that "[m]ost all
conspiracies [charged] do usually involve substantial steps."
... The indication that prosecutors generally do not charge
conspiracy in the purely inchoate situations is shown further by the
prevailing view that requiring a substantial overt act would cause no
more than a small reduction in the number of convictions ... . Some
prosecutors with whom I spoke expressed concern about requiring a
substantial overt act, but they do not believe that many conspiracy
charges involve insignificant overt acts.5 6

The true concern is not how Shabani will affect future rulings.
Instead, it goes to a somewhat dismissive attitude of the Justices toward
the very real problems inherent in the conspiracy charge and a change in
direction from previous and far more sensitive views regarding
prosecutorial overreach in this area.
As noted above,5 7 decades earlier the Court in Grunewald was quite
reluctant to define the conspiracy doctrine so as to allow for implied
agreements to conceal, thereby extending relevant statute of limitations
periods. Justice O'Connor acknowledged Grunewald in the Shabani
opinion but did not call out the broad language of the earlier Court, or its
much more narrow view of the conspiracy charge. And, there certainly
was no reference in Shabani to the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson
in Krulewitch sounding the alarm about the conspiracy charge.
Quite

the contrary:
Respondent contends that these decisions were rendered in a period
of unfettered expansion in the law of conspiracy, a period which
allegedly ended when the Court declared that "we will view with
disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping
nets of conspiracy prosecutions." Grunewald, however, was a statute
of limitations case, and whatever exasperation with conspiracy
56.
57.

Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement, in Theory and in Practice, supranote 6, at 930-32.
See supranote 3.

58.

See supratext accompanying note 4.
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prosecutions the opinion may have expressed in dictum says little about
the views of Congress when it enacted § 846. 5

That, though, hardly tells the full story of Grunewald. Justice
Harlan, there for the majority, expressed serious reservations about the
government's use of the conspiracy charge:
Prior cases in this Court have repeatedly warned that we will view
with disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and widesweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions.
The important
considerations of policy behind such warnings need not be again
detailed. It is these considerations of policy which govern our holding
today. As this case was tried, we have before us a typical example of a
situation where the Government, faced by the bar of the three-year
statute, is attempting to open the very floodgates against which
Krulewitch warned. We cannot accede to the proposition that the
duration of a conspiracy can be indefinitely lengthened merely because
the conspiracy is kept a secret, and merely because the conspirators
take steps to bury their traces, in order to avoid detection and
punishment after the central criminal purpose has been accomplished. 60

And Grunewald was not the only case showing disquiet among the
Justices regarding the use of the conspiracy charge. Lutwak v. United
61
StateS is another. There, in a decision looking to whether declarations
of co-conspirators were made during the course of the conspiracy, the
Court wrote:
In the trial of a criminal case for conspiracy, it is inevitable that
there shall be, as there was in this case, evidence as to declarations that
is admissible as against all of the alleged conspirators; there are also
other declarations admissible only as to the declarant and those present
who by their silence or other conduct assent to the truth of the
declaration. These declarations must be carefully and clearly limited
by the court at the time of their admission and the jury instructed as to
such declarations and the limitations put upon them. Even then, in
most instances of a conspiracy trial of several persons together, the
application of the rule places a heavy burden upon the jurors to keep in
mind the admission of certain declarations and to whom they have been
restricted and in some instances for what specific purpose. While these
difficulties have been pointed out in several cases, the rule has
nonetheless been applied. 62

59. Shabani, 513 U.S. at 14 (citation omitted).
60. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1957) (italics added) (citation omitted).
61. 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
62. Id. at 618-19 (citations omitted).
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Yet again, in Kotteakos v. UnitedStates, 63 this unease came through,
there with an appeal contending that while one conspiracy was charged,
in fact multiple conspiracies were proven at trial:
There are times when of necessity, because of the nature and scope
of the particular federation, large numbers of persons taking part must
be tried together or perhaps not at all, at any rate as respects some.
When many conspire, they invite mass trial by their conduct. Even so,
the proceedings are exceptional to our tradition and call for use of
every safeguard to individualize each defendant in his relation to the
mass. Wholly different is it with those who join together with only a
few, though many others may be doing the same and though some of
them may line up with more than one group.
Criminal they may be, but it is not the criminality of mass
conspiracy. They do not invite mass trial by their conduct. Nor does
our system tolerate it. That way lies the drift toward totalitarian
institutions. True, this may be inconvenient for prosecution. But our
Government is not one of mere convenience or efficiency. It too has a
stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual
protections, including those surrounding criminal trials. About them
we dare not become careless or complacent when that fashion has
64
become rampant over the earth.

The language of Justices Harlan, Minton, and Rutledge in these cases
signals deep hesitation about the conspiracy charge and the way in which
it can unfairly affect the accused conspirator. Language that is direct and
open-language that is simply not found in Shabani.
In addition, while the Court in Shabani was correct in noting that the
common law did not require an overt act, the conspiracy crime in both
England and the U.S. under the early common law was quite a limited
offense. 65 As the scope of the crime broadened, the overt act element
66
appeared more and more in the states as well as in the federal system.
And, for good reason, the overt act serves a significant purpose in at least
some cases. It is there to be sure that-with the limited proof needed to
show agreement 6 7-there is a true danger created by the pact, to show

§§

63.
64.

328 U.S. 750 (1946).
Id. at 773.

65.

See PAUL MARCUS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES,

1.01-05 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2015).
66. The language is usually something like "an overt act," (see, e.g., 8 GUAM CODE ANN. §
95.30 (2014)), "some act" (see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 184 (West 2012)), or "any act" (the
general federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012), uses this term, as do several state statutes such as W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-10-31 (West 2002)), in furtherance of the agreement.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66.

2015]

THE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY THRIVES

391

that there is a criminal endeavor "still at work."6 8
Two earlier Justices of the Supreme Court did not downplay the
importance of the overt act. For Chief Justice Vinson (then sitting as a
Circuit Judge), "[t]he statutory crime differs from common-law
conspiracy in that it requires an overt act. That is made an essential to
give the conspirators a time, a place, and a chance to say that although
we did agree, now that we are about to start, let's call it off." 6 9 As stated

by Justice Harlan, "[t]he function of the overt act in a conspiracy
prosecution is simply to manifest 'that the conspiracy is at work,' and is
neither a project still resting solely in the minds of the conspirators nor a
fully completed operation no longer in existence." 70
One sees no such discussion by Justice O'Connor as to the
importance of an overt act requirement. That failure is all the more
telling considering how little is needed for the government to prove the
agreement, the "essence" of the crime. 7 ' "An agreement need not be
explicit; a tacit agreement may support a conspiracy conviction."7 2 As
the Supreme Court itself noted, "Participation in a criminal conspiracy
need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may
be inferred from a 'development and collocation of circumstances."' 73
And "the government is entitled to prove its case solely through
circumstantial evidence."74 While the nature of the evidence needed for
the government's case in conspiracy prosecutions has been sharply
critiqued, few observers would doubt the breadth of the conspiracy
68. State v. Heitman, 629 N.W.2d 542, 553 (Neb. 2001) (quoting State v. Hansen, 562 N.W.2d
840, 849 (Neb. 1997)).
69. United States v. Offut, 127 F.2d 336, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
70. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957) (citation omitted), overruled by Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
71. United States v. Martin, 618 F.3d 705, 735 (7th Cir. 2010).
72. United States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted).
73. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (internal citation omitted), superseded by
statute, FED. R. EvID. 104(a), as recognized in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). As
stated in Ladd v. State, "the agreement to commit the criminal act 'need not be formal or express, but
may be inferred from the circumstances, particularly by declarations, acts, and conduct of the alleged

conspirators."' 87 So. 3d 1108, 1113 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
74. United States v. Pica, 692 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). Numerous
cases so hold. See, e.g., United States v. Arrellano, 757 F.3d 623, 633 (7th Cir. 2014) ("A jury is not
limited to direct evidence and may find an agreement to conspire based upon circumstantial evidence

and reasonable inferences drawn from the relationship of the parties, their overt acts, and the totality
of their conduct." (citing United States v. Wantuch, 525 F.3d 505, 519 (7th Cir. 2008)). Some
pattern jury instructions also make this point. See, e.g., § 5.1 Conspiracy (§ 53a-48), 5 Conn. Prac.,
Criminal Jury Instructions § 5.1 (4th ed.) ("Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that there
was an agreement between, because conspiracies by their very nature, are formed in secret and only
rarely can be proven other than by circumstantial evidence.").

75.

Seesupranotes9and10.
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charge. All the more reason, then, to have at least some discussion as to
whether it would be appropriate to consider the wisdom of implying an
overt act requirement to a conspiracy statute. One finds no such
discussion in Shabani.
D. The NonhearsayHearsay Exception76
We turn now to a case that is highly significant and well known
especially-and properly so-for its focus on one rule of evidence. The
case, quite familiar to most who work on white collar crime and
organized drug prosecutions, is Bourjaily v. United States.77 The Chief
Justice there, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Blackmun, 8 wrote of the
reach of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), the traditional coconspirator hearsay exception. While an evidentiary ruling, it is
extremely important in conspiracy prosecutions. To be sure, it is
difficult to imagine many such prosecutions in which the exception is not
raised at some point. Before looking at the decision, though, a few
preliminary observations are necessary regarding the rule.
The co-conspirator hearsay exception is certainly not new to
conspiracy prosecutions. For decades the United States Supreme Court
has discussed it7 9 and for good reason: the co-conspirator rule likely is, as
pointed out by Justice Powell, "the most frequently used exception to the
hearsay rule." 80 The rule can be stated simply: an out-of-court statement
offered at trial to prove the truth of the statement is not excluded by
76.

With thanks to my colleague Jeff Bellin for his helpful comments on the evidence materials

in this section.

77.
78.

483 U.S. 171 (1987).
Joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Stevens concurred specially.

79. Indeed, for well over one-half century commentators have analyzed the Court's rulings
about the exception. For one of the earliest, and best, looks, see Joseph H. Levie, Hearsay and
Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MICH. L.

REV. 1159 (1954).
80. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 398 (1986). The principle surrounding co-conspirator
declarations actually no longer arises as an exception to hearsay. It is, instead, denominated by
Congress and many state legislatures to be non-hearsay. However, almost no one [including
members of the Supreme Court] would refer to this in any way other than as a hearsay exception.
Moreover, as noted by one federal judge, "[lt]he distinction between a statement which is not hearsay
and a statement which is an exception to the hearsay rule is semantic and is not determinative of the

outcome of this case." United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978) (citation
omitted).

Others have been far less generous in noting the Congressional action.

As one judge

wrote, soon after the enactment of the federal rules: "[iun that new code, the admissibility of the
hearsay statements of a co-conspirator was codified, by a legislative finding that such statements are

not hearsay. Like Humpty Dumpty in "Through the Looking Glass," a legislative body, when it
uses a word such as "hearsay," can make that word mean what it wants it to mean." United States v.

Buettner-Janusch, 500 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (emphasis added).
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hearsay considerations if that statement was made by a conspirator
during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of it.8 ' This rule is
simple to state, but it is often difficult to apply-as we shall see. But,
first, a notation is necessary to show that the rule is significant not just
because it comes up so often. There are other reasons, as well. "[A] coconspirator's statement is admissible as if it were the defendant's own
statement." 82 Moreover, the statement will be admissible upon a theory
of a joint venture, even though no conspiracy has been charged. 8 3 In
addition, a trial judge may allow the statement to be heard by the jury
even before enough evidence has been offered to show the rule has been
satisfied. 84
The majority in Bourjaily construed a few different sections of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in answering three questions brought before
it.8 5 Only one is especially worthy of consideration here, and that relates
to the use of the disputed statement itself. Years earlier, the Court
determined that the declaration could not be used to establish the basis of
the co-conspirator hearsay exception-that there was an ongoing
conspiracy to which the declaration related.86 The Justices there, in the

81. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement "made by [a defendant]'s
coconspirator during [the course of] and in furtherance of the conspiracy" may be introduced as
nonhearsay. In addition to the federal rule, many states have similar rules (often with the same

numbering system). See, e.g., IOWA R. EvID. 5.801(d)(2)(E); N.H. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); N.C. R.
EVID. 801(d)(E).
82. United States v. Blair, No. 1:06-CR-39-TLS, 2006 WL 3392941, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 22,
2006).
83. State v. Hudson, 775 N.W.2d 429, 436 (Neb. 2009); United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197,
201 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Byrd v. State, 187 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
84.

It can be admitted "provisionally," subject to connection. Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67

A.3d 19, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2012); United
States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 2009). If it is not ultimately connected,
the jury can be instructed to disregard the statement.

In rare cases, the judge can then order a

mistrial. United States v. Loza, 763 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D.D.C. 2011).
85. Here are the three questions:
(1) whether the court must determine by independent evidence that the conspiracy existed
and that the defendant and the declarant were members of this conspiracy; (2) the
quantum of proof on which such determinations must be based; and (3) whether a court
must in each case examine the circumstances of such a statement to determine its

reliability.
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 173 (1987).

It is the first question at issue here. The

second question was not terribly controversial. In line with the strong majority of courts, the usual
standard of preponderance of the evidence was tagged. As to the third question, an interesting set of
issues arose, but, at the time, they came under the broader question of the rigidity of the

Confrontation Clause. The issues have changed a good deal with the Court's decision in Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
86. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 87 (1942), superseded by statute, FED. R. EvID.
104(a), as recognized in Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 171.
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87

Glasser decision, were concerned that if the declaration itself could be
used to prove the factual predicate for the exception, there would be a
"bootstrapping operation" in play.88 Or, as the Court there explained:
"[S]uch declarations are admissible over the objection of an alleged coconspirator, who was not present when they were made, only if there is
proof aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy. Otherwise
hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent
evidence." 89
Without getting into the intricacies here of evidence law, one must
realize that in Bourjaily the Court had to construe the recently enacted
Federal Rules of Evidence to decide whether the earlier Glasser
limitation had been withdrawn by Congress. In taking the government
position, the six-Justice majority looked to the language of the Rules and
thoroughly downplayed the concerns earlier expressed in Glasser:
[A] piece of evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become quite
probative when corroborated by other evidence. A per se rule barring
consideration of these hearsay statements during preliminary
factfinding is not therefore required. Even if out-of-court declarations
by co-conspirators are presumptively unreliable, trial courts must be
permitted to evaluate these statements for their evidentiary worth as
revealed by the particular circumstances of the case. Courts often act
as factfinders, and there is no reason to believe that courts are any less
able to proper1l recognize the probative value of evidence in this
particular area.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 75.
89. Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted). The Court reaffirmed this position in United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) ("Declarations by one defendant may also be admissible against
other defendants upon a sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a conspiracy among one or
more other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in furtherance of that
conspiracy.").
90. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 180. On the matter of the language of the new federal rules, the
majority was also somewhat dismissive of the defense position:
Petitioner concedes that Rule 104, on its face, appears to allow the court to make the
preliminary factual determinations relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) by considering any
evidence it wishes, unhindered by considerations of admissibility. That would seem to
many to be the end of the matter. Congress has decided that courts may consider hearsay
in making these factual determinations. Out-of-court statements made by anyone,
including putative co-conspirators, are often hearsay. Even if they are, they may be
But petitioner
considered, Glasser and the bootstrapping rule notwithstanding.
nevertheless argues that the bootstrapping rule, as most Courts of Appeals have construed
it, survived this apparently unequivocal change in the law unscathed and that Rule 104, as
applied to the admission of co-conspirator's statements, does not mean what it says. We
disagree.
Petitioner claims that Congress evidenced no intent to disturb the bootstrapping rule,
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This result did not have to be. After all, most federal circuit courts
prior to Bourjaily had found that Glasserremained in force even after the
adoption of the Federal Rules. To be sure, even today, many state courts
looking to their own identical sections on co-conspirator declarations
will not allow those declarations to be considered in deciding the factual
predicate.91 More to the point, however, is the reason courts have
which was embedded in the previous approach, and we should not find that Congress
altered the rule without affirmative evidence so indicating. It would be extraordinary to
require legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of Rule 104. The Rule on its face
allows the trial judge to consider any evidence whatsoever, bound only by the rules of
privilege. We think that the Rule is sufficiently clear that to the extent that it is
inconsistent with petitioner's interpretation of Glasser and Nixon, the Rule prevails.
Id at 178-79 (citation omitted).
91. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, not bound by the Federal Rules, recently
revisited the matter and agreed with the Bourjaily dissenters, explaining the need for the independent
evidence requirement:
(1) it "ensures the reliability of coconspirator's statements admitted at trial by
determining that sufficient corroborating evidence of a conspiracy exists," and (2) it
"guards against the danger of 'bootstrapping,' i.e., using hearsay evidence to justify its
own admission."
Jenkins v. United States, 80 A.3d 978, 990 (D.C. 2013) (internal citation omitted). The Jenkins
court set out the decisions of the several state courts which have rejected the position of the
Bourjaily majority. Id. at 992 n.30. While highly significant, Bouraily ought not to be overstated.
That is, the majority there expressly held open the question of whether the hearsay statement itself
could be the entire basis for the factual predicate: "We need not decide in this case whether the
courts below could have relied solely upon Lonardo's hearsay statements to determine that a
conspiracy had been established by a preponderance of the evidence." Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181.
In fact, almost all courts-both state and federal-looking to the matter do require other independent
evidence of the conspiracy before the co-conspirator's declaration can be admitted. United States v.
Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67 A.3d 19, 27 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2013); United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The court in
State v. Hudson echoed the earlier statement of the United States Supreme Court:
The purpose of requiring independent evidence to establish a conspiracy is "to prevent
the danger of hearsay evidence being lifted by its own bootstraps, i.e., relying on the
hearsay statements to establish the conspiracy, and then using the conspiracy to permit
the introduction of what would otherwise be hearsay testimony in evidence."
775 N.W.2d 429, 436 (Neb. 2009) (internal citation omitted).
One District Judge explained the rationale for his ruling:
Under the pre-Bouraily standard, this extremely incriminating hearsay statement by a
conspirator linking a fellow defendant to the conspiracy would be irrelevant in
Under the liberal
determining its own admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
interpretation of Bourjaily, this statement could be sufficient by itself to permit its
admission to the jury. The court believes that this latter interpretation of Bourjaily would
be the logical equivalent of the Queen of Hearts call for "sentence first-verdict
afterwards." L. Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Oxford University Press
1983), at 165. Moreover, it would usurp the screening function of the court and
encourage the manufacture of testimony in criminal conspiracy cases. The better view
requires the government to present independent evidence which corroborates the
hearsay's inference that a defendant was a coconspirator of the hearsay declarant.
United States v. Gambino, 728 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
Later Congressional action clearly established what the majority in Bourailyavoided, a requirement
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required independent evidence with the co-conspirator hearsay
exception: it is grounded in sound policy.
We typically do not allow hearsay statements in at trials for fear that
without proper cross-examination of the original declarant we cannot feel
confident that the underlying statement is one that should be trusted. 92
Under Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a number of
exceptions to this principle are laid out. See, for instance, these:
*

Statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment.

*

Records of a regularly conducted activity.

*

Learned treatises.

*

Excited utterances. 93

The thread with these exceptions is that while the statements are
hearsay, they may generally be viewed as reliable. After all, why would
a scholar lie in a treatise? Who could imagine a patient not giving
accurate information when discussing a medical condition with a doctor
under the Rule that the statement itself cannot be the only evidence to support the necessary
findings: "The statement must be considered but does not by itself establish the declarant's authority
under (C); the existence or scope of the relationship under (D); or the existence of the conspiracy or
participation in it under (E)." FED. R. EVID. 801. As explained in the advisory committee's note to
1997 amendment:
[T]he amendment resolves an issue on which the Court had reserved decision. It
provides that the contents of the declarant's statement do not alone suffice to establish a
conspiracy in which the declarant and the defendant participated. The court must
consider in addition the circumstances surrounding the statement, such as the identity of
the speaker, the context in which the statement was made, or evidence corroborating the
contents of the statement in making its determination as to each preliminary question.
This amendment is in accordance with existing practice. Every court of appeals that has
resolved this issue requires some evidence in addition to the contents of the statement.
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note to 1997 amendment; see Wiest v. Lynch, 15 F. Supp.

3d 543, 563 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
92.

Judge Posner, concurring in United States v. Boyce, remarked:

One reason that hearsay normally is inadmissible (though the bar to it is riddled with
exceptions) is that it often is no better than rumor or gossip, and another, which is closely
related, is that it can't be tested by cross-examination of its author.

742 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring).
He went on to call for an overhaul of the whole system involving hearsay.
The "hearsay rule" is too complex, as well as being archaic. Trials would go better with

a simpler rule, the core of which would be the proposition (essentially a simplification of
Rule 807) that hearsay evidence should be admissible when it is reliable, when the jury
can understand its strengths and limitations, and when it will materially enhance the
likelihood of a correct outcome.
Id at 802.
93. See cases cited infra note 94.
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or nurse? 94
With the co-conspirator hearsay exception, however, no one
contends that the declaration is inherently reliable. To be sure, Justice
Black almost seventy years ago expressed the view, shared by others,
that "[t]here are many logical and practical reasons that could be
advanced against a special evidentiary rule that permits out-of-court
statements of one conspirator to be used against another." 95 It is not
reliability or trustworthiness that is the basis for the exception. 9 6 Rather,
the entire grounding of the exception is a legal fiction that has been oft
noted. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Bourjaily, discussed this
point-a discussion that was not challenged by the majority. The coconspirator exception unquestionably is based on agency principles: "the
underlying concept being that a conspiracy is a common undertaking
where the conspirators are all agents of each other and where the acts and
statements of one can be attributed to all." 97
94. As explained in the advisory committee note, "Rule 803 . . . is based upon the assumption
that a hearsay statement falling within one of its exceptions possesses qualities which justify the
conclusion that whether the declarant is available or unavailable is not a relevant factor in
determining admissibility." FED R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note to 1972 amendment. For
an excellent discussion, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Casefor eHearsay, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1330

(2014). Forjudicial affirmations of the reliability notion, see the following cases:
Medical Diagnosis: United States v. Chaco, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1211 (D.N.M. 2011) ("The Rule
803(4) exception to the hearsay rule is founded on a theory of reliability that emanates from the
patient's own selfish motive-her understanding 'that the effectiveness of the treatment received
will depend upon the accuracy of the information provided to the physician."') (internal citation
omitted).

Business Records: Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 702 (E.D. Va. 2004)
("The theory behind the business records exception embodied in Rule 803(6) is that '[r]eports and
documents prepared in the ordinary course of business are generally presumed to be reliable and
trustworthy.' Records of that sort are considered trustworthy because 'businesses depend on such
records to conduct their own affairs; accordingly, the employees who generate them have a strong
motive to be accurate and none to be deceitful' and secondly, because 'routine and habitual patterns
of creation lend reliability to business records."') (internal citations omitted).

Learned Treatise: Costantino v. Herzog, 203 F.3d 164, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2000). ("The rationale for
this exception is self-evident: so long as the authority ofa treatise has been sufficiently established,

the factfinder should have the benefit of expert learning on a subject, even though it is hearsay.").
95. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949).
96. As explained in one thoughtful commentary, truly no one looks to reliability or
trustworthiness as the reason to have the co-conspirator hearsay exception. David S. Davenport, The
Confrontation Clause and the Co-ConspiratorException in Criminal Prosecutions:A Functional

Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1378, 1384-85 (1972) ("[T]he major development of the exception has
been the result of a seemingly random appeal to various of the following rationales: (1)

a

characterization of conspiracy as a relationship of mutual agency, with the admissions of one
conspirator thereby being treated as vicarious admissions by the others; (2) a characterization of
many of the statements of conspirators as 'acts' of the conspiracy (elements, in themselves, of the

crime); and (3) an allegation of special need for lax rules of evidence in prosecutions for such a
traditionally secret and inchoate crime.") (internal citations omitted).

97.

Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 188 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

For a
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As stated rather succinctly by one state supreme court, "[T]he
admissibility of [this exception] does not depend on trustworthiness." 98
No, the rationale here is quite different, and this rationale can be seen as
linked to the famous statement of Judge Learned Hand, repeated
throughout the years: "[w]hen men enter into an agreement for an
unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another, and have made
'a partnership in crime.' What one does pursuant to their common
purpose, all do, and as declarations may be such acts, they are competent
against all." 99
The problem with the opinion in Bourjaily is not necessarily the end
result reached, 00 but rather yet again an insensitivity to or unwillingness
to acknowledge any defense claim of undue prejudice in a conspiracy
prosecution. In many, perhaps most, cases, the prosecutor will be able to
offer considerable non-hearsay evidence to support findings of a
conspiracy to which the statement relates and a conclusion that the
statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of that
conspiracy. This may be true in most such cases-but not all. And, in a
close case, that damning determination will be based not on a belief that
the statement is nevertheless reliable, but rather on the agency fiction.
Resolving such an important matter on a legal fiction seems dubious at
best. As Justice Holmes wisely observed long ago, "When logic and . .
policy. . . conflict with a fiction due to historical tradition, the fiction
must give way."' 0
E. Those Joint Trials CertainlyAppear More Efficient
[There is] the specific prejudice that results when defendants
become weapons against each other, clawing into each other with
antagonistic defenses. Like the wretches in Dante's hell, they may
become entangled and ultimately fuse together in the eyes of the ury,
so that neither defense is believed and all defendants are convicted.

&

good discussion of Justice Blackmun's dissent, see Byrd v. State, 187 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005).
98. State v. Tedesco, 513 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Vt. 1986) (internal citation omitted), overruled in
part on other grounds in State v. Gallagher, 554 A.2d 221, 223 (Vt. 1988). The court in Tedesco
explained that under the Vermont Rules of Evidence, statements by a co-conspirator are treated as
admissions by a party-opponent. Id. This would also be true under the Federal Rules.
99. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926) (internal citations omitted).
100. And, as noted above, Congress on its own thereafter amended the Rule. Supra note 91.
101. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 206 (1903), overruled in part by Farmers' Loan
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
102. United States v. Romanello, 726 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1984).
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There was a time, not so very long ago, when courts recognized that
antagonistic defenses offered in multiple defendant conspiracy trials
created such a difficult dilemma for all that there was a hard rule, or at
least a strong presumption, in favor of separating the defendants,
severing such trials.103 After the United States Supreme Court's 8-1
decision in Zafiro v. United States,10 4 that position is long gone, replaced
instead with the notion that "[m]utually antagonistic defenses are not
prejudicial per se." 05
The decision in Zafiro matters a great deal and is, in my judgment,
wrong as a matter of policy. The Justices were again highly insensitive
to serious defense claims, here that problems can arise in multiple
defendant criminal trials. Let me state, at the outset, that I am not
suggesting that the presumption generally as to single trials for multiple
defendants is somehow misguided or inappropriate. The rule has been
around for many decades,106 and in the vast majority of cases little
concern is raised as to such joinder of defendants. Zafiro, however, did
not involve the usual sort of joinder. Here, at least arguably, the issue
was one of antagonistic defenses. o7 And, in such a situation, the strong
presumption ofjoinder ought not to be the standard.

.

103. See Scott Hamilton Dewey, The Case ofthe Missing Holding: The MisreadingofZafiro v.
United States, the Misreplication of Precedent, and the Misfiring ofJudicialProcess in Federal
Jurisprudenceon the Doctrine of Mutually Exclusive Defenses, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 149, 152 (2006)
(noting that the Supreme Court in 2afiro, infra, "contradicted existing practices in most circuits,
which by then presumed a mandatory severance rule for irreconcilable defenses . .

104. 506 U.S. 534 (1993).
105. Id. at 537-38; see also Dewey supranote 104, at 152.
106. Statements abound in both federal and state court decisions that "defendants who are
jointly indicted should be tried together." See Harris v. Commonwealth, Nos. 201 1-CA-002336MR, 2012-CA-000024-MR, 2013 WL 4508002, at *3-4 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2013); United
States v. Driver, 535 F.3d 424, 427-28 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1236
(1lth Cir. 2005), abrogatedon other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006);
People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 174, 187 (111. 1995); United States v. Vega, 309 F. Supp. 2d 609,
614-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants
who are indicted together, because joint trials promote efficiency and avoid the problems of
inconsistent verdicts.") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Druzenko, Nos. 12-404101/04-CR-C-BP, 13-4026-01/02-CR-C-BP, 2013 WL 5741088, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 23, 2013)
("[R]arely, if ever will it be improper for co-conspirators to be tried together" (citing United States v.
Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 1998))); Diaz-Dumenigo v. United States, No. I1-2222(PG),
2014 WL 3870572, at *6 (D.P.R. Aug. 7, 2014) ("For severance to be granted, a defendant 'must
demonstrate prejudice so pervasive that it would be likely to effect a miscarriage of justice."')
(internal citations omitted). See generally People v. Mahboubian, 543 N.E.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. 1989)
("[P]ublic policy favors joinder, because it expedites the judicial process, reduces court congestion,
and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses.").
107. It turns out that the defendants in Zafiro, while claiming antagonistic defenses, did not
actually show such irreconcilable differences, as analyzed by Justice Stevens in his concurrence. See
infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
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There are many multiple defendant criminal trials and it would be
impossible to have severance allowed in all such cases. Justice Scalia,
almost 30 years ago, wrote that "[]oint trials play a vital role in the
criminal justice system, accounting for almost one-third of federal
criminal trials in the past five years." 08 And, as he pointed out, quite a
number of those trials can be extremely large. "Many joint trials-for
example, those involving large conspiracies to import and distribute
illegal drugs-involve a dozen or more codefendants."l 09 To routinely
grant severance in all joint defendant trials would be terribly disruptive
with little benefit even for the charged defendants.
Still, what has happened since Zafiro is quite striking. Defendants
rarely have severance motions granted, leading some courts to write that
"it will be the rare case, if ever, where a district court should sever the
trial of alleged coconspirators." 1 10 And, severance motion denials are not
at all limited to the non-antagonistic defense cases. There are numerous
cases, usually relying on Zafiro, where trial judges do not grant motions
to sever even with an offering of antagonistic defenses. Many cases
involve trial judges denying motions for severance and citing both the
holding and language of Zafiro. As stated in one appeals decision:
[The defendant] is left with a prejudicial-joinder argument-that
antagonistic defenses required severance.

Zafiro v. United States,

however, forecloses that argument.
Zafiro expressly held that
severance is not required when codefendants present mutually
antagonistic defenses. Since Zafiro, we have consistently held that

&

108. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987). He relied on a memorandum from the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts to the Supreme Court Library. Extensive
searching has not uncovered any more recent statistics on point, though few experienced criminal
defense professionals would contend that the numbers have declined. The closest research on point
was conducted about ten years ago on joint charges in the federal system. See Andrew D. Leipold
Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact ofJoinder and Severance on Federal Criminal Cases: An Empirical
Study, 59 VAND. L. REv. 349, 364-65 (2006) ("During the same five-year period, nearly two-thirds
(65%) of federal defendants were charged alone, while the remaining one-third were joined with
others, either in the original indictment or via Rule 13.").
109. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209. Those numbers have seemingly not declined much in the
years after the decision, as I explained a few years after the decision in Richardson. See Paul
Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back From an Ever Expanding, Ever More
Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. I (1992). For a look at more recent such cases, see
United States v. Munoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) (15-month trial, four defendants
were found guilty of bank fraud, conspiracy, and misapplication of bank funds); Baker, 432 F.3d at
1198-1200 (15 indicted co-conspirators, a 17-count indictment, and a seven-week trial with almost
100 witnesses and considerable physical evidence); United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 410-11
(6th Cir. 2000) (three-month trial with six defendants; defendant had been charged in a 25-count
indictment along with 16 co-defendants on charges relating to the activities of "Cosa Nostra," but
the trial court severed the trial of six defendants).
110. United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 844 (8th Cir. 2002).
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blame-shifting among codefendants, without more, does not mandate
Ill
severance.
The result in Zafiro was neither inevitable nor necessarily
predictable. As the case developed, two things became clear. First, the
defendants in the case did not really raise antagonistic defenses. True
antagonistic defenses in multiple defendant trials are not terribly
common. As pointed out by Justice O'Connor in her majority opinionll 2
and Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, a true defense which is
"mutually antagonistic" to another defense means that "acceptance of
one defense ...
necessarily preclude[s] acceptance of the other and
acquittal of the codefendant."' 1 3 The defenses must be "mutually
exclusive."' 1 4 The defendants must be on an evidentiary "collision
course."" 5 It is not enough that there be conflicting arguments by the
defense lawyers,' 16 or that there is "fingerpointing" by each side.'"7 In
Zafiro, neither defendant involved testified, and each defense claim was
simply that the government had not shown his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The essence of their position was that the individual defendant
did not know the contents of a box (which contained a whole lot of
cocaine)." 8 As Justice Stevens wrote, the trial judge was correct in
concluding that the defenses presented in Zafiro were not mutually
antagonistic.
When two people are apprehended in possession of a container
filled with narcotics, it is probable that they both know what is inside.
Il l. United States v. Plato, 629 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). For other
examples of such rulings, all relying on 2afiro, see Jenkins v. United States, 113 A.3d 535, 542
(D.C. 2015) ("irreconcilable defenses do not require severance if 'the conflict in defenses alone
would not sway the jury"' (quoting Tillman v. United States, 519 A.2d 116, 171 (D.C. 1986))); State
v. Foster, 839 N.W.2d 783, 800 (Neb. 2013) ('"finger pointing' alone does not create mutually
exclusive defenses sufficient to require separate trials"); Flores v. Long, No. EDCV 12-02031 CJC
(AN), 2013 WL 5539554, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013) ("[joint trial] expedites the administration
of justice, reduces the congestion of trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens the burden upon
citizens who must sacrifice both time and money to serve upon juries, and avoids the necessity of
recalling witnesses who would otherwise be called upon to testify only once" (quoting Parker v.

United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 1968))).
112. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993).
113. Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., concurring).
114. See State v. Kinkade, 680 P.2d 801, 803 (Ariz. 1984); Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 545 n.l (Stevens,
J., concurring).

115. Hill v. State, 481 So. 2d 419, 424 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).
116. See United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 1999).
117. Bums v. State, 638 S.E.2d 299, 300-01 (Ga. 2006).
118. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 536. The defendants were charged with various drug offenses,
including conspiracy, linked to the illegal contents of the box found in their possession. Id. at 53536.
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The inference of knowledge is heightened when, as in this case, both
people flee when confronted by police officers, or both people occupy
the premises in which the container is found. At the same time,
however, it remains entirely possible that one person did not have such
knowledge. That, of course, is the argument made by each of the
defendants in this case: that he or she did not know what was in the
crucial box or suitcase.
Most important here, it is also possible that both persons lacked
knowledge of the contents of the relevant container. Moreover, that
hypothesis is compatible with individual defenses of lack of
knowledge. There is no logical inconsistency between a version of
events in which one person is ignorant, and a version in which the other
is ignorant; unlikely as it may seem, it is at least theoretically possible
that both versions are true, in that both persons are ignorant. In other
words, dual ignorance defenses do not necessarily translate into
"mutually antagonistic" defenses, as that term is used in reviewing
severance motions, because acceptance of one defense does not
necessarily peclude acceptance of the other and acquittal of the
codefendant.

The defendants could not satisfy the collision course requirement for
antagonistic defenses, nor could either of them actually "articulate any
specific instances of prejudice." 20 In short, this was the perfect case for
the Court-acknowledging the inherent difficulties with multiple
defendant conspiracy trials-to recognize the general preference for joint
trials and, in Justice Stevens' words, "save for another day evaluation of
the prejudice that may arise when the evidence or testimony offered by
one defendant is truly irreconcilable with the innocence of a
codefendant."l 2 1 The majority could just have disposed of the case using
that approach. True, the defendants had requested a bright line rule
"mandating severance whenever codefendants have conflicting
defenses." 22 The Court could easily have rejected such a rigid rule, and
have deferred consideration of that requirement. Instead, the majority
strongly reaffirmed the preference notation, bringing within it cases
involving antagonistic defenses actually stated.
The decision of the Court is broad, and it is of genuine significance.
119. Id. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The situation here was not
exactly the extreme case contemplated by courts which had made special allowances for antagonistic
defense scenarios, as in State v. White: "The classic example of intrinsically antagonistic defenses is
where both defendants blame each other for the crime while attempting to defend against the State's
case." State v. White, 67 P.3d 138, 147 (Kan. 2003) (quoting State v. Pham, 675 P.2d 848, 855
(Kan. 1984)).
120. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.
121. Id. at 543 (Stevens, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 538.
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As noted above, prior to Zafiro, many courts had-at minimum-been
favorably inclined to grant severance motions if true antagonistic
defenses were presented. The Seventh Circuit opinion in Zafiro made
this clear: "[A] vast number of cases say that a defendant is entitled to a
severance when the 'defendants present mutually antagonistic defenses'
in the sense that 'the acceptance of one party's defense precludes the
acquittal of the other defendant .... 123 This is true no longer. Instead,
today the norm is to hold that "[s]everance .. . is not mandated whenever
co-defendants have conflicting defenses."l 24
How did this state of affairs come about? The reason is rather plain
to see: the Court in Zafiro was, here too, dismissive of the defense
concerns. To be sure, not only did the Justices not find a mandatory
severance requirement for cases involving antagonistic defenses
generally, severance may not be needed even if prejudice can be
shown. 12 5 Instead, relief is left to the discretion of the trial judge, likely
to be in the form of jury instructions. 12 6 The decision was certain on this
point: "[m]oreover, even if there were some risk of prejudice, here it is of
the type that can be cured with proper instructions, and 'juries are
presumed to follow their instructions."' 1 2 7
Here is the Court's
description of the instructions the jury received in Zafiro:
The District Court properly instructed the jury that the Government
had "the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt" that each
defendant committed the crimes with which he or she was charged.
The court then instructed the jury that it must "give separate
consideration to each individual defendant and to each separate charge

123. United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 1991).
124. State v. Daniels, 636 N.E.2d 336, 344 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). See generally Collins v.
Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The [Zafiro] Court declined adopting such a brightline rule, holding that mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se."); People v. Hardy,
825 P.2d 781, 828 (Cal. 1992) ("If the fact of conflicting or antagonistic defenses alone required
separate trials, it would negate the legislative preference for joint trials and separate trials 'would
appear to be mandatory in almost every case."') (quoting People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 313
(1984)).
125. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 540 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). Whether jurors are
indeed able to follow such a charge in a case in which defendants are fighting each other must be
open to some question. Indeed, even Justice Scalia in Richardson wondered out loud about this in
that setting:
The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted

less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it
represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the
defendant in the criminal justice process.
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211.
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against him. Each defendant is entitled to have his or her case
determined from his or her own conduct and from the evidence [that]
may be applicable to him or to her." In addition, the District Court
admonished the jury that opening and closing arguments are not
evidence and that it should draw no inferences from a defendant's
exercise of the right to silence.1 28

'

While the direction was seemingly "boiler plate" in nature and not at
all tailored to the facts involved, Justice O'Connor found that "[tihese
instructions sufficed to cure any possibility of prejudice." 1 29
If, then, such standard instructions will normally be sufficient to
eliminate prejudice even with antagonistic defenses, what will it take for
a judge to feel obliged to order severance? The answer: quite a lot. As a
practical matter, one sees few severance orders after Zafiro based on
claims of antagonistic defenses. 3 0 The reason for this is that the Court in
Zafiro set the standard quite high in terms of what must be shown by the
defendant to warrant a severance. The order should only be granted if
there is a "serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial
right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable
judgment about guilt or innocence.""3
Several examples of somewhat extreme situations were offered by
128. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 541 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Though there are some. See, e.g., State v. Anker, 2005 WL 823750, at *2-6 (Del. Super.
Ct. Apr. 4, 2005); United States v. Mayfield, 189 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 1999); State v. Tate, 657
So. 2d 567, 568-69 (La. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Robinson, Nos. 1K93-10-0475-0477, IK93-100478-0480, 1994 WL 684483, at *1 -2 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 1994). As written in People v. Nixon,
severance was required because "there [was] a significant danger, as both defenses [were] portrayed
to the trial court [in the pretrial motion and the motion for a mistrial], that the conflict alone would

lead the jury to infer defendant's guilt." 908 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (quoting
People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174, 184 (N.Y. 1989). Prior to Zafiro, such decisions were
somewhat routine. For a particularly strong ruling, see People v. Cardwell:
Special factors unique to this case compel us to conclude that there should have been a
severance. These factors include the conduct of the trial itself. While no one factor is

dispositive in such matters, we note that in this case McCoy's attorney took an aggressive
adversarial stance against both Goss and Cardwell, in effect becoming a second

prosecutor. Goss' attorney then responded by attempting to impeach McCoy's story with
evidence of a recantation, which elicited an assertion from McCoy that the recantation

had been induced by Cardwell's threats-damaging evidence elicited not by the People,
but by a codefendant.... [T]his entire situation "created the sort of compelling prejudice
that could have been avoided by the grant of the requested severance."

580 N.E.2d 753, 754 (N.Y. 1991) (quoting People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174, 186 (N.Y. 1989)).
131. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. After extensive research and various search approaches, my
research assistant and I were unable to determine the exact number of decisions which rely on Zafiro
to reject severance requests. Using Westlaw's functions we found that well over 2000 state and
federal decisions cite Zafiro while discussing trial severance. While lacking precise numbers, it is
easy for me to conclude that almost all of them neither grant motions for severance nor reverse
denials of such motions.
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the majority. 32 Still, those situations will not be common and will not
begin to address Justice Stevens' more general concern:
[that joinder] may invite a jury confronted with two defendants, at least
one of whom is almost certainly guilty, to convict the defendant who
appears the more guilty of the two regardless of whether the prosecutor
has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to that particular
defendant. Though the Court is surely correct that this second risk may
be minimized by careful instructions insisting on separate consideration
of the evidence as to each codefendant the danger will remain relevant
to the prejudice inquiry in some cases.
Indeed, the lower federal courts [and many state courts as well] have
looked to Zafiro and concluded that it does indeed impose "a limit on
[trial judges' traditional] discretion ['to consider severance whenever
In fact, quite a
mutually antagonistic defenses are presented']." 34
number of courts, relying on Zafiro, have gone well beyond the language
of the decision, in requiring for a successful motion to sever a showing of
substantial harm. "'[P]otential for prejudice' is not enough, and instead,
132.

Id. at 539, stating:

We believe that, when defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district
court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint
trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury
from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Such a risk might occur when
evidence that the jury should not consider against a defendant and that would not be
admissible if a defendant were tried alone is admitted against a codefendant. For
example, evidence of a codefendant's wrongdoing in some circumstances erroneously
could lead a jury to conclude that a defendant was guilty. When many defendants are
tried together in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability,

this risk of prejudice is heightened. Evidence that is probative of a defendant's guilt but
technically admissible only against a codefendant also might present a risk of prejudice.
Conversely, a defendant might suffer prejudice if essential exculpatory evidence that
would be available to a defendant tried alone were unavailable in a joint trial.

(citations omitted).
133.

Id. at 544 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).

He stated the matter rather

forcefully: A joint trial involving "joinder may introduce what is in effect a second prosecutor into a
case, by turning each codefendant into the other's most forceful adversary." Id. "[M]utually
exclusive defenses [may] transform a trial into 'more of a contest between the defendants than
between the people and the defendants."' Id. at 543. The court in United States v. Green nicely

stated the problem:
The issue is whether a jury will be able to hear the opposing position-the defense
theory-and reliably consider all positions. There is a considerable risk that each
defendant, ably throwing pot-shots at the other, would make the government's case for it.

Specifically, in the din, a juror could well say: "I cannot figure out who did the shooting,
given the defendants' mutual accusations, but it doesn't matter. They were involved
somehow and that is enough." That conclusion would redound to the government's
benefit.

324 F. Supp. 2d 311, 325 (D. Mass. 2004).
134. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 545 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the prejudice must be 'compelling.""" One federal appeals decision
certainly reinforced the tone of the Zafiro opinion, if not the exact
language:
[T]he rule about a joint trial in conspiracy cases is not quite
ironclad. The exceptional circumstances justifying a deviation from the
rule, however, are few and far between. A defendant seeking a
severance must carry the "heavy burden of demonstrating [that]
compelling prejudice" would result from a joint trial.' 36
In short, one commentator was quite correct when he wrote, more
than 15 years ago: "As a practical matter, Zafiro has made it exceedingly
difficult for a defendant to persuade a trial judge to grant a severance
motion, especially in conspiracy prosecutions." 37
What is especially troubling about the Court's decision, and the
many cases following it, is that with all the severance motions, trial
judges are construing statutory provisions, which call for such severance
in the appropriate case. In the federal system, those provisions are Rules
8(b) and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 38 The former
establishes the basis for joinder, the latter for severance. Rule 8(b)
provides for relatively simple joinder of co-conspirators: "The indictment
or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to
have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of
acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses."' 3 9 The key here
is Rule 14: "If the joinder of . .. defendants .. . for trial appears to
prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate
trials of counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief
that justice requires." 40 Justice O'Connor in Zafiro focused attention on
the merits of Rule 8(b) in allowing for joinder and creating judicial
efficiency and basic fairness. Joint trials "are designed 'to promote
135. United States v. Fagan, 518 F. App'x 749, 752 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1234 (11th Cir. 2011)). See generally United States v. Sinha, No. 1:14cr9HSO-JMR, 2014 WL 1794862, at *1-2 (S.D. Miss. May 6, 2014); United States v. Williams, No.
2:14-er-48-FtM-29DNF, 2014 WL 6469410, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2014); United States v.
Grace, No. 4:09-CR-19-DPJ-LRA, 2010 WL 419381, at *1-3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 29, 2010); United
States v. Aiken, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
136. United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1234 (1lth Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
137. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Prejudice to the Nth Degree: The Introduction of Uncharged
Misconduct Admissible Only Against a Co-defendant at a Megatrial, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 35, 36
(2000).
138. Most states have similar provisions. See, e.g., I.C.R. 8, 14; OHIO CRIM. R. 8, 14; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-8a-1 (LexisNexis 2015).
139. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).
140. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a).
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economy and efficiency and to avoid a multiplicity of trials."' 4 1 What
she did very little of, however, was discuss how a defendant can be
deeply hurt when-in Justice Stevens' words-"the evidence or
testimony offered by one defendant is truly irreconcilable with the
innocence of a codefendant."l 42 And, this can happen, even when one is
not able to show before trial any specific forms of compelling prejudice.
Sadly, one does not see in the Zafiro majority opinion the type of
thoughtful concern expressed in the pre-trial proceedings involving one
of the truly horrific criminal acts of the previous century, the Oklahoma
City bombing case. There the trial judge granted a motion to sever. He
explained why:
Preference for a joint trial of persons charged with conspiracy and
with aiding and abetting crimes assumes efficiencies resulting in
conservation of resources, reduction in inconveniences to witnesses and
public authorities, avoidance of delays and mitigation of adverse effects
on witnesses and victims. Such assumptions must be analyzed for their
validity in any particular case and their value may be outweighed by
the compelling interest in the fairness and finality of the verdict.
There are efficiencies and advantages in single focused trials. The
time needed for jury selection is significantly reduced: the number of
defense peremptory challenges is halved and only one defense counsel
conducts voir dire questioning. It is easier to apply the rules of
evidence when there is a trial of one defendant, particularly with regard
to the admissibility of statements offered under Rule 801(d)(2);
character evidence under Rule 404(a)(1) and proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and identity under
Rule 404(b). Given these considerations, it is far from certain that the
time required for two separate trials would, in total, be substantially
greater than the time required for a joint trial. 143
III. CONCLUSION
There was a time, not so terribly long ago, when Justices of the
United States Supreme Court were quite concerned with the elasticity of
the conspiracy charge and the manner in which that charge was
prosecuted. This attitude was reflected in numerous opinions mandating
caution and restraint in prosecuting criminal conspiracies. That view
seemingly has vanished from the Court. In both determining which cases

141. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968)).
142. Id. at 543.
143. United States v. McVeigh, 169 F.R.D. 362, 370 (D. Colo. 1996).
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to review and in resolving those matters, the Justices instead have
repeatedly emphasized that conspiracy-in the words of the drafters of
the Model Penal Code-can [along with attempt and solicitation]create "infinite degrees of danger." 1 " In the decisions discussed here,
we have seen strong reaffirmations of prosecutorial positions and general
dismissals of defense objections. This attitude is most unfortunate. It is
true that conspiracies may, without question, need to be sanctioned. It is
also true, however, that an overuse of the conspiracy doctrine along with
a tipping of the procedural scales well beyond what had been seen before
can create terribly difficult and unfair trial situations. It is time for the
Supreme Court to take a more balanced and moderate approach to
criminal conspiracy.

144. Herbert Wechsler et al., The Treatment ofInchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 1029

(1961).

